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THE APPLICATION AND AVOIDANCE OF FOREIGN
LAW IN THE LAW OF CONFLICTS
Variations on a Theme of Alexander Nekam*
Gregory S. Alexandert
Plaisante justice, qu'une rivi~re ou une montagne borne:
Veritg au degi des Pyrnges, erreur au delti.
B. Pascal, Pensges no 108 (Lafuma ed. 1951).
Lying at the heart of all conflicts theories is a recognition that
the function of the law of conflicts is to ensure rational and just
solutions to controversies involving foreign elements. A just and
rational solution is one that somehow accommodates those elements.
This does not mean that the foreign law must be applied but simply
suggests that at least some attention should be paid to that law in the
process of resolving disputes. From these relatively uncontroversial
postulates, one moves to the more difficult problem of defining the
role of foreign law in the conflicts setting.
Attention in this area is usually focused on the theoretical bases
for the displacement of forum law by some foreign rule related to the
matter through one or more connecting factors.' However, implicit
in attempts to develop normative standards for choosing foreign
substantive rules is the assumption that those rules can be applied by
the forum in some sensible fashion. To assume otherwise renders
* The author is greatly indebted to Alexander Nekam, now Professor Emeritus at
Northwestern University School of Law, under whom research for this paper was
begun as part of Northwestern's Senior Research Program. For those parts of this
analysis which are inconsistent with Professor Nekam's views the author accepts full
responsibility. Professor Nekam's theme was foreshadowed in his earlier book, A.
NEKAM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF THE LEGAL ENITY (1938), and is re-
flected in l's recent article, Nekam, The Law of Conflicts and Comparative Law:
Some Similarities and Limitations, 34 LA. L. Rnv. 1077 (1974). He plans to publish
a general exposition of his conflicts theory in the near future.
The author also wishes to acknowledge his appreciation for the assistance pro-
vided by Professor Max Rheinstein of The University of Chicago Law School.
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Georgia; B.A., University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1970; J.D., Northwestern University, 1973.
1 See, e.g., Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 CoLUM.
L REv. 964 (1958), in B. CUMIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 3
(1963) [hereinafter cited as CuRuni].
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conflicts rules-other than those which direct the application of
forum law in all circumstances-meaningless. But in what sense can
it be said that the forum applies any law other than its own? Most
commentary on this question has directed itself to such practical
concerns as the effect of failing to plead foreign law.2 While these
issues are by no means insignificant, a fuller understanding of the
problems involved in the application of foreign law must be based on
the premise that foreign law3 is different in kind from the law of the
forum and that this difference frequently affects the way in which the
forum treats the foreign law. This article examines the means by
which courts in the conflicts setting have attempted to accommodate
the relevant foreign elements and attempts to explain what it means
for the forum to apply a foreign law. The intent here is primarily
descriptive: to clarify what we are talking about when we say that the
forum applies a foreign law.
THE PROBLEM DEFINED
Nearly all legal systems require that foreign law be applied in
some appropriate circumstances. 4 However, the rules directing appli-
cation of a foreign law do not provide standards for carrying out this
responsibility.5
It might be argued that problems involved in the application of
foreign law are no different from difficulties encountered in applying
forum law. Courts are frequently required to deal with unfamiliar
domestic statutes, yet this occasionally imperfect knowledge of domes-
tic law does not refute the general presumption jura novit curia. Simi-
2 See, e.g., Schlesinger, A Recurrent Problem in Transnational Litigation: The
Effect of Failure to Invoke or Prove the Applicable Foreign Law, 59 CORNELL L.
REv. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Schlesinger].
3 "Foreign law" as used in this article refers to both foreign country rules and
sister-state law, unless otherwise noted. One caveat should be added, however; the
problem of applying a sister-state foreign law is usually not as acute as that of ap-
plying the rule of another nation. While some material differences do exist among
the laws of the several states, they are not nearly as frequently encountered as dif-
ferences with foreign national laws. In a similar vein, degrees of difference exist
with regard to foreign country rules. The laws of common law nations, for ex-
ample, are more likely to parallel our own on a given topic than are the rules of,
say, Zaire. These observations are not intended as truisms, but simply to acknowledge
at the outset that the foreign law "problem" is not monolithic.
4 Appropriate circumstances are defined by the conflicts rules of the forum.
5 It might be said that in the context of interstate conflicts the Constitution pro-
vides a standard in the full faith and credit clause. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. But
even its language does not go very far in explaining how the forum is to give credit
to a foreign state's rule.
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larly, the forum's knowledge of foreign law may be imperfect, but the
responsibility of learning that law as a condition to applying it is the
same in these circumstances as it is with regard to unfamiliar domes-
tic law. One weakness of this analogy is that instances of unknown
or unfamiliar domestic law, though perhaps not infrequent, are the
exception. Total ignorance or imperfect knowledge of foreign law,
on the other hand, is the rule. This lack of knowledge is "a natural
consequence of the training of the judges in the law of their own
country."6
Moreover, when confronted with an unfamiliar domestic legal
rule, the forum court has the advantage of being able to study it in a
familiar context.7  The rule will be viewed in relation to other
relevant provisions of domestic law with which the court is presuma-
bly acquainted. The advantage 'which this circumstance gives the
forum court is considerable. Rules cannot be fully understood in
isolation; they are interrelated and in some instances interdependent.8
When the court is called upon to learn and apply a foreign rule, it will
necessarily view that rule in relative isolation. Even if it attempts to
develop its understanding of the foreign law by examining related
provisions, the forum still lacks that exposure to the foreign system
which is essential to a complete understanding of the single provi-
sion.9
Nevertheless, the view that foreign law can be reached and
applied as easily as domestic law still prevails.' 0 This notion is
6 Zajtay, The Application of Foreign Law, 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 14-1, 14-13 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Zajtay].
7 The difference of contexts and relative familiarity with contexts supports the
distinction, earlier noted, between sister-state law and foreign nation law. Although
an Illinois judge is not likely to be as familiar with Indiana law as he is with his
own state's rules, he will have considerably greater grasp of Indiana law than
German law. While important differences between Illinois and Indiana law may
and do exist, the context of Indiana law is relatively familiar to the Illinoisian. See
note 3 supra.
s This idea is explained and developed on a jurisprudential level in J. RAZ, THE
CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (1970) [hereinafter cited as RAz]. The chapter en-
titled "On the Individuation of Laws" is particularly useful in this regard.
9 The Supreme Court recently recognized that this difficulty may exist even in
the interstate context. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
10 See, e.g., Schlesinger, supra note 2. A less accepted view is that only an impres-
sion of foreign law can be achieved. This dichotomy of approaches to the treatment
of foreign elements reflects the historical struggle between general theories of con-
flicts law. From early on, the competing tendencies have been centrifugal and
centripetal, or to borrow Ehrenzweig's language, pluralistic and unitarian. The
latter attempts to resolve conflicts through an assumed higher law, while pluralism
604
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reflected, for example, in our choice-of-law rules, which implicitly
assume that a foreign rule may be applied with the same confidence
as a familiar domestic rule. This assumption is indicated by a basic
purpose which conventionally is ascribed to choice-of-law rules-
uniformity of result.11 The flaws in this approach to the foreign law
problem become apparent, however, when one examines both the
difficulties encountered by the courts in their attempts to reach and
apply foreign law and the techniques employed to avoid these diffi-
culties.
TECHNIQUES FOR HANDLING FOREIGN LAW QUESTIONS
A variety of techniques is available to the forum in resolving
foreign law problems. Not all of them, however, require the court to
confront the task of finding and enforcing a foreign law which is
ostensibly applicable. Courts continue to resort to well-established
procedural devices which avoid the problem and at the same time
mask the difficulties involved in reaching any foreign law. Judicial
notice and presumptions as to the content of foreign law, for example,
allow the courts to create the appearance of having determined the
law to be applied, yet they are essentially nonconflicts techniques
which implicitly deny the existence of an alien law.
The Fact Approach to Foreign Law
Before these techniques are considered, it is helpful to discuss
briefly the common law's "fact" approach to resolving foreign law
questions, which was adopted by American courts and has persisted
in most jurisdictions to the present day."2 Foreign rules, upon which
a party seeks to rely, are regarded not as elements of a legal system,
but as facts's which have to be pleaded and proved by the litigant.
denies the existence of any legal order higher than that of the forum. See A.
EHRENzwEiG, A TREATiSE ON THE CONFLIcr OF LAWS 3-16 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as EHRENZWEIG]; Yntema, The Historical Bases of Private International Law, 3 AM.
J. CoMp. L. 297 (1953).
11 Professor von Mehren recently suggested that the movement by courts and
writers away from rigid conflicts rules has been associated with a minimization of the
importance of uniformity as a primary goal of the law of conflicts, von Mehren,
Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in
Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REv. 347, 350-56 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as von Mehren].
12 See note 27 infra.
13 For a more complete discussion on the source of the fact approach, see Sass,
Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Survey, 16 AM. J. CoMp. L. 332,
335-39 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Sass].
605
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The asserted theoretical justification for this rule is that, since the
forum is capable of applying only domestic law, every other element
in the case must be treated as a fact to be proved.' 4  Failure to
comply with this requirement often resulted in immediate dismissal of
the claim based upon a foreign law. 15
It is useful to examine the fact approach for two reasons. First,
the view that foreign law is a fact provides a theoretical foundation
for the techniques of applying-or avoiding-foreign law. Second,
this approach facilitates the accommodation of foreign elements, by
providing a simple solution to the procedural and evidentiary difficul-
ties encountered when foreign elements are introduced. The parties
are required to present to the court the foreign rule sought to be
applied, thus relieving the court of the burden of conducting its own
research. Moreover, adherence to the fact approach serves to ration-
alize a court's consideration of the precise foreign rule pleaded in
isolation rather than as it relates to other provisions in the foreign
legal system. 16 As the court cannot consider facts not stated in the
pleadings-apart from the judicial notice exception' 7 -it may not
refer to a foreign legal "fact" not pleaded by the parties.
The classic illustration of this approach and its "sudden death"
consequences is Cuba R.R. v. Crosby.'8 The Supreme Court, speak-
ing through Justice Holmes, refused to take cognizance of a cause of
action for a tort committed in Cuba because no evidence was offered
on Cuban law. The lower court had held that if Cuban law differed
from the lex fori, the defendant had the burden of alleging and
proving so. However, in the absence of such evidence, it would 9
apply the law as it conceives it to be, according to its idea of
14 See generally 0. SOMMERICH & B. BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw: A GumE TO PLEAD-
ING AND PROOF 11-12 (1959) [hereinafter cited as SOMMERICH & BUSCH].
15 Frequently, however, dismissal is ordered with leave to replead. See, e.g.,
Harrison v. United Fruit Co., 143 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
16 This comment anticipates objections to the fact approach which are based upon
a jurisprudential discussion of the individuation of laws. See generally RAZ, supra
note 8, at 70-92.
17 It may be contended that this exception is so broad as to negate the rest of the
statement. The field of judicial notice arguably encompasses all facts not contained
in the pleadings. But this contention clearly cannot withstand scrutiny. Under any
view of judicial notice, there are some facts of which the court may not take judicial
notice, though it is not necessary for present purposes to give a general account of
these facts. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 201. See generally J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN,
J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 12-31 (1973).
18 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
19 Id. at 477 (quoting the lower court opinion).
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right and justice; or, in other words, according to the law of
the forum.
Justice Holmes rejected this approach and reaffirmed the common
law view of foreign law and foreign "rights":
20
[T]he only justification for allowing a party to recover when
the cause of action arose in another civilized jurisdiction is a
well founded belief that it was a cause of action in that place.
The right to recover stands upon that as its necessary founda-
tion. It is part of the plaintiff's case, and if there is a reason
for doubt he must allege and prove it.
The common law's fact approach to foreign law comported with
the views of Joseph Beale and other vested rights theorists, including
Justice Holmes. Beale posited that every act creates within its territo-
rial boundaries definite rights or obligations, and the forum is obliged
to recognize and enforce these rights even though they are foreign
created.21 Foreign law, however, operates within the forum only as a
fact,2 2 since every law is strictly territorial in operation23 and therefore
cannot function as law outside its territorial parameters. It should be
noted that this theory does not indicate when foreign rights should be
protected by the forum; rather it explains how the foreign right is
enforced.
The internal law of the forum which is applied, in Beale's view,
is that "which deals with the solution of conflicts. 24 If the internal
law dictates that in a given situation a foreign law supplies that
solution, then the forum is required to look to that law. Foreign law
is not "applied" in the sense that it directs the decision. Rather, "the
national law provides for a decision according to certain provisions of
the foreign law."2 5 Foreign law is relevant only as a fact which must
be proved according to the approach of the internal law of the forum.
20 Id. at 479 (emphasis supplied).
21 An extreme instance of effect being given to this view is the majority opinion
in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), where Justice Holmes wrote:
The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was sub-
ject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an ob-
ligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced
wherever the person may be found.
Id. at 126.
22 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 5.4 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as BEALE].
23 See id. § 5.2; 2 BEALE, supra note 22, § 377.2; REsrATEmENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1, at 378-79 (1934).
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While Beale's vested rights theory has been thoroughly discredit-
ed,26 the fact approach persists. It has been suggested that the
enactment of rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
signaled the demise of the common law fact approach.28  However,
even though rule 44.1 provides that "[t]he court's determination
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law," the foreign law issue
is, for some purposes, still treated as a question of fact.29 Adherence
to the fact approach permits a court to avoid the problem of ascer-
taining and applying the foreign law in its entirety. As mentioned
previously, 30 the burden of discovering the applicable foreign law
rests upon the parties, and, if this responsibility is not satisfied, the
court may dismiss the contention based on that law. Since this
consequence seems unduly harsh, strict adherence to the fact ap-
proach is relatively rare. Instead, the courts have resorted to fictions
which avoid both the foreign law problem and the sudden death
consequences of the fact approach.
Presumptions as to Foreign Law
In order to avoid a detailed examination of a foreign ,legal
system, courts, under the guise of enforcing foreign law, have fre-
quently resorted to presumptions about the content of that foreign
law. The use of presumptions is rationalized on the ground that they
enable a court to reach the same result that would have been reached
by a court in the foreign jurisdiction."' In practice, however, the
26 The first and perhaps most thorough attack was mounted by Professor Walter
Wheeler Cook. See W. Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1942).
27 For a collection of statutes reflecting the fact approach, see R. SCHLESINGER,
COMPARATIVE LAw 67-69 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as ScHLESlNGER].
28 FED. R. Cirv. P. 44.1. See Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach
to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L.
REv. 613, 657 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
29 The intent of rule 44.1 was merely to indicate that the court, not the jury, has
the responsibility of resolving the foreign law issue and that this determination is
to be treated on appeal as legal rather than factual. Moreover, the second sentence
of the rule shows that it was not the intent of the draftsmen to equate foreign law
and domestic law for all purposes. Had that been the intention, the court would
have been given the complete responsibility for ascertaining the foreign law, but
the rule leaves to the court's discretion the decision whether to take judicial notice
of a foreign rule. See Sass, supra note 13, at 342-47.
30 See text accompanying notes 12-20 supra.
31 See generally 3 BEALE, supra note 22, §§ 622A.1-23.1; CuRME, supra note 1,
at 21; SOMMERICH & BuscH, supra note 14, at 75-80; Kales, Presumption of the
Foreign Law, 19 HARV. L. Rnv. 401 (1906); Miller, supra note 28, at 634; von
HeinOnline -- 70 Nw. U. L. Rev.  608 1975-1976
Application of Foreign Law
commonly employed presumptions simply permit the forum court to
apply its own law.
Essentially, three foreign law presumptions have been employed
by the courts: 2 (1) the court will presume, in the interests of
"inherent justice," that the rudimentary principles of law necessary to
support the claim are recognized in all civilized countries and that the
foreign state in question, being civilized, would give effect to the
claim;33 (2) the law of the foreign state will be presumed to be the
same as the law of the forum, where both states were originally part
of the common law world; and (3) the law of the foreign state,
regardless of the history of its legal system, is presumed to be the
same as the law of the forum. 4
One objection to the first presumption is that the test for deter-
mining which principles are rudimentary is inherently subjective. One
writer has remarked that "the difference between rudimentary princi-
ples and subtle refinements is quite arbitrary."35  Moreover, the
courts appear quite uncertain as to whether the rudimentary princi-
ples are capable of identification or whether they are more akin to a
priori natural law concepts which are not susceptible to cataloguing. 36
Under either view, it is likely that resort to such principles is a mere
guise for avoiding the foreign law question.
37
Moschzisker, Presumptions as to Foreign Law, 11 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1926); Wachtell,
The Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L. REV. 526, 580, 585-88
(1935); Comment, Judicial Notice and the Deposition Practice in International Liti-
gation, 1966 DuKE L.J. 512, 513-14; Comment, Conflict of Laws-Judicial Notice
of Foreign Law, 30 MIcH. L REV. 747, 755-61 (1932). See text accompanying notes
130-34 infra.
32 See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 1; Miller, supra note 28. See also Schlesinger,
supra note 2, at 7-8.
33 See, e.g., Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590 (1911).
34 The presumptions may vary depending upon whether they cover statutory pro-
nouncements as well as case law.
35 CURmE, supra note 1, at 22.
30 It is quite possible that the meaning of this expression changes with the cur-
rently popular ideas. Thus at the time of the Parrot decision, the court may have
been referring to natural law principles. Presently, however, the court's reference
to "rudimentary principles of law" may be directed toward some universal behavioral
norm. See 1 R. SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRAcTs: A STuny OF THE COM-
MON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS (1968):
[O]nce such principles are established, independently of a particular litigation,
as pre-existing norms discovered through disinterested scholarly research, there
will be less reason to fear arbitrary judicial action.
Id. at 11.
37 Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590 (1911), aptly il-
70:602 (1975)
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Perhaps because of the arbitrariness of determining which prin-
ciples are "rudimentary" and the inconsistency of decisions using the
first presumption,38 the second presumption has been more frequently
employed. The court presumes that the common law still prevails in
the foreign jurisdiction and that it is the same as the law of the
forum.3 9 Arguably, this presumption could originally have been
justified on the ground that the common law acted as a kind of higher
law with only slight variances in content among the several common
law jurisdictions. Gradually, however, the identity presumption was
extended into a third presumption covering situations in which the
foreign state involved was not a common law jurisdiction.
Illustrative of. this third presumption is Louknitsky v. Louknit-
sky,40 a divorce suit in which the wife claimed certain California
realty as her separate property. The real property was purchased in
large part with the earnings and proceeds of earnings of the defendant
husband while both parties resided in China. The parties subse-
quently moved to California. Because neither side pleaded or intro-
duced evidence concerning Chinese law, the court presumed that
Chinese marital property law was the same as California's community
property law. Thus the funds acquired in China were considered
community property.
Apart from the questionable result, the court's approach was
little more than a thin disguise for the application of the forum's law
without regard to the peculiarities of the lex fori4' and without
lustrates judicial fiat through the use of presumptions. In this action for breach of
an alleged oral contract, the court indulged in the view that
in an action upon a simple contract of this kind, there is a broad general pre-
sumption of the fact that such a contract creates a liability in all civilized
countries ....
Id. at 194, 93 N.E. at 594. The enforceability of an oral contract of this kind in
civil law nations is highly suspect, even in countries such as France. See C. Cirv.
art. 1341 (69e ed. Petits Codes Daloz 1970). See also Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller,
302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962) (applying fundamental principles of Oklahoma tort
law but not the Oklahoma Workmen's Compensation Act, in the absence of proof
of Turkish law); Enter v. Crutcher, 159 Cal. App. 2d 841, 323 P.2d 586 (1958)
(Costa Rican law governing bills of exchange presumed to be the same as that of
the forum in the absence of evidence to the contrary).
38 See, e.g., Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 125 Misc. 417, 211 N.Y.S. 270
(Sup. Ct. 1925), modified, 217 App. Div. 685, 217 N.Y.S. 226 (Sup. Ct. 1926);
Liachovitzky v. New York Life Ins. Co., 126 Misc. 109, 212 N.Y.S. 722 (Sup. Ct.
1925).
39 Annotation, Presumptions as to Laws of Foreign Countries, 75 A.L.R.2d 529
(1961).
40 123 Cal. App. 2d 406, 266 P.2d 910 (1954).
41 California community property law is peculiar even in the United States. How
likely is it, then, that it is the same as Chinese law?
610
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acknowledgment of the radical difference between the legal systems. 42
Whatever justification the identity presumption may have had origi-
nally, its use is wholly inappropriate in circumstances where there is
little or no correspondence between the lex fori and the law of the
foreign jurisdiction. Like the "rudimentary principles" presumption,
then, the presumption of identity became an obvious device for
avoiding the foreign law issue.
A more satisfactory approach to the problem was taken in Leary
v. Gledhill." In an action to recover on an alleged loan made in
France by plaintiff to defendant, the plaintiff failed to introduce
evidence as to the law of France. The court first surveyed the
alternative methods of handling the foreign law issue in the absence
of proof of that law. It rejected the presumption that the common
law exists in the foreign jurisdiction, stating that, while the presump-
tion might be useful in other situations, it was not helpful here
because the common law on the subject had been altered by statute in
the forum and did not exist in the foreign state.44 Also rejected was
the presumption that French law, like the law of all civilized coun-
tries, recognizes as a fundamental principle that the mere fact of a
loan creates an obligation on the part of the borrower to make
repayment. The court recognized that in many cases it may be
difficult to ascertain whether the principle presented is so fundamen-
tal as to warrant the assumption that it would be similarly applied by
all civilized nations. Having rejected the identity and fundamental
principle presumptions, the court concluded:
45
The presumption that in the absence of proof the parties ac-
quiesce in the application of the law of the forum, be it statutory
-law or common law, does not present any such difficulties for
it may be universally applied regardless of the nature of the
controversy.
42 It is worth noting that the transition from employing the presumption of identity
among common law states to jurisdictions outside the common law group may occur
without any acknowledgment. By tracing the decisions on which the Louknitsky
court relied, this development will be seen. The court cited as support Christ v.
Superior Court, 211 Cal. 593, 598, 296 P. 612, 614 (1931), where the foreign law
was that of Guatemala. The Christ opinion cited Wickersham v. Johnson, 104 Cal.
407, 38 P. 89 (1894), where English law was involved, but the opinion contains no
reference to the difference between the common law and the civil law system. The
earliest California case on this question appears to be Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal.
226, 252-54 (1860), where the court, in an opinion by Judge Field, carefully dis-
tinguished the second and third presumptions.
43 8 N.J. 260, 84A.2d 725 (1951).
44 See CUREIE, supra note 1, at 22-23.
45 8 N.J. at 269-70, 84 A.2d at 730.
70:602 (1975)
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Although a more sensible approach to the foreign law problem than
those rejected by the court, the acquiescence rationale still adheres to
the questionable presumptive form. Why should the court presume
any intent of the parties? Why should it not simply apply its own law
in the absence of proof of the foreign law?46 This would surely be
the more straightforward course to follow, for,4 7
however artificial may be the reproductions [which presump-
tions] yield of the foreign law, their general tendency is to bring
about the application of the law of the forum ...
The presumption technique has come under increasing attack by
courts as well as commentators. In Old Hickory Products, Ltd. v.
Hickory Specialties, Inc.,48 Hickory Specialties, sued by Old Hickory
Products for unfair advertising and wrongful appropriation of trade
secrets, demanded that its insurer defend the suit under its contract
of insurance. Upon the insurer's refusal, Hickory Specialties defend-
ed itself and filed a third party complaint against the insurer for all
sums for which it might become liable. The parties stipulated that
the insurance contract was entered into and delivered in Florida. The
law of Georgia, the forum state, provided that the construction of the
contract is governed by the law of the place of its making (Florida).
The defendant insurer moved for summary judgment on the ground
that under Florida common law the existence of an insurer's obliga-
tion to defend is determined by the allegations in the plaintiff's
pleadings and that plaintiff's original pleadings alleged conduct by
the insured not covered by the policy. Old Hickory responded that,
while Florida law governs the construction of a contract, under the
Erie-Klaxon rule4 9 a federal court in Georgia must follow the inter-
pretation which the Georgia courts would give Florida law, and,
accordingly, the insurer had the duty to defend if, under the actual
circumstances of the case, whether or not properly pleaded, the policy
46 Apart from objecting to the acquiescence theory on the ground of its presump-
tive form, it is also undesirable because it would allow a foreign law to be applied
only where both parties are subjects of the same foreign jurisdiction or where both
sides are from different nations having the same legal system. See The Scotland,
105 U.S. 24, 31-32 (1881). This would create an unfairly narrow range of situa-
tions in which the forum might apply a foreign law.
47 CuRmE, supra note 1, at 50 (footnote omitted). Currie here makes reference
to the decision in Leary.
48 366 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
49 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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afforded coverage to the plaintiff and those circumstances were
known or were reasonably ascertainable by the insurer.5
Under Georgia case authority, in order for a foreign statute to be
considered by the forum court it had to be pleaded and proved. If
this requirement was satisfied, the case law of the foreign state could
then be consulted when interpretative of the statute. However, when,
as here, there was no foreign statute governing the issue in dispute,
the Georgia courts would presume that the common law prevailed in
that state and the courts of Georgia would not be bound "by the
interpretation of the common law made by the courts of a foreign
state, but will decide what is the common law."51
The district court rejected this approach, indicating its disen-
chantment with the sophistry of presumptions: 52
In the present action, then, while paying lip-service to the no-
tion that Florida law should govern the construction of a con-
tract made in Florida . . . the Georgia courts would apply
Georgia's interpretation of "the common law," or more simply,
Georgia law.
Concluding that Florida law alone was applicable, the court noted
that a recently enacted Georgia statute had eliminated the earlier
decisional rule requiring the pleading and proving of foreign statutory
law and barring the Georgia courts from looking to foreign case
law.53 The court observed that the new statute was enacted in part to
5o See Tennessee Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 463 F.2d 548
(5th Cir. 1972); Associated Petroleum Carriers v. Pan American Fire & Casualty
Co., 117 Ga. App. 714, 161 S.E.2d 411 (1968); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Keane, 11l Ga. App. 480, 142 S.E.2d 90 (1965).
51 366 F. Supp. at 915, citing Gorman v. Griffin, 70 Ga. App. 585, 589, 28
S.E.2d 897, 899 (1944); Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. v. Fein, 342 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.
1965); Jesse Parker Williams Hospital v. Nisbet, 189 Ga. 807, 811, 7 S.E.2d 737
(1940); Record Truck Line, Inc. v. Harrison, 109 Ga. App. 653, 137 S.E.2d 65
(1964). With regard to this rule, Judge Brown in Budget Rent-A-Car observed:
The traditional function of conflicts-of-laws rules in contracts is to afford a
degree of certainty and symmetry as controversies stray to localities which are
strangers. They need not, therefore, necessarily make sense. There are judicial
outcroppings in Georgia which reflect some dissatisfaction with a rule that, in
this day and time with the plethora of law publications, digests, reports, law
reviews, and texts, still "presumes"--without the slightest inquiry which a good
Georgia lawyer would make-that the law of another state (here, right next
door) in the Union is the same as Georgia.
342 F.2d at 514 n.9. What Judge Brown fails to take into account is that while
a conflict-of-laws rule which is not entirely sensible may sometimes be justified on
the basis of expediency and necessity, it cannot be justified where a more sensible
alternative exists. In this instance several alternatives, all preferable to the Georgia
rule according to Judge Brown's criteria, were available.
52 366 F. Supp. at 915 (footnote omitted).
53 GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-143(c) (1972). This Act is substantially identical to
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avoid the presumption of identity5 4 and cited Louknitsky as exem-
plary of the strained reasoning which the statute was intended to
eliminate.5 5 This statute, then, eliminated all vestiges of the common
law's restrictions against recognizing foreign decisional law and al-
lowed the court to look to Florida cases as supplying the rule of
decision.
56
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
Dissatisfaction with the presumption technique increased until
some states enacted statutes permitting courts to take judicial notice
of a foreign rule not pleaded or proved.57  These statutes were
rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court looked to the
federal rule as a guide in interpreting the Georgia Act. The only significant dif-
ference between rule 44.1 and the Georgia statute is that while the federal rule
applies only to foreign nation law, section 81A-143(c) applies to sister-state law as
well.
54 See text accompanying notes 13-29 supra.
55 366 F. Supp. at 920-21. The court's characterization of the identity presumption
is unusually straightforward:
Not to be omitted from the difficulties inherent in a presumption of identity is
the unreality attendant to a doctrine which insists that the common law of
Georgia and Florida are the same, when a look into the Southern Reporter,
forbidden by that presumption, will show that they are not.
Id. at 921.
56 Despite its realistic appraisal of common law presumptions, the court in Old
Hickory erroneously viewed the presumption as related only to the procedural re-
quirement that foreign law be pleaded and proved. The presumption was, in the
court's view, divorced from any substantive choice-of-law rule and, therefore, had
never been determinative as to which of two state laws shall apply:
The presumption of identity has always been invoked after the ritual incanta-
tion that no law or statute of the controlling state was pleaded. To the court,
this careful separation between the controlling state law and the interpretation
to be given to that law demands the conclusion that the presumption of identity,
rather than being a substantive choice-of-law rule, is part and parcel of
Georgia's adherence to the common-law rule that foreign law be pleaded and
proved.
Id. at 920. In effect, the court concluded that presumptions are procedural rather
than substantive in character.
The court failed to recognize that the common law presumption of identity or
any presumption of law has the effect of resolving the choice-of-law issue. In some
instances, in fact, it is intended to have precisely that effect. Georgia law may
provide that lex loci delicti governs but if the lex locus is presumed to be the same
as Georgia's common law, the presumption, characterized by the Old Hickory
court as merely interpretive of the lex locus, in effect furnishes the rule of decision.
It is not purely procedural but rather part and parcel of the substantive choice-of-
law rule.
This distinction is not without effect. As Professor Schlesinger has stated, it
has serious ramifications with regard to Erie questions. See Schlesinger, supra note
2, at 5.
57 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-143(c) (1972). In Seaboard Air-Lines Ry.
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designed to avoid the same undesirable consequences which flow
from the fact approach and its pleading requirement as the pre-
sumptions had sought to remedy, i.e., dismissal of the foreign law-
based arguments of one of the litigants. The court could, through
judicial notice, determine the foreign law without proof by the liti-
gants. Failure by one of the parties to establish the foreign law
applicable to his case would theoretically no longer result either in
dismissal or in presumptive application of the law of the forum. The
court ostensibly would seek out the foreign law and actually apply it.
Judicial notice statutes, however, have not provided a satisfac-
tory solution to the foreign law problem. Such statutes normally leave
to the court's discretion the decision whether to take judicial notice of
a foreign law,58 and, as one commentator has noted, "In exercising
this discretion, courts naturally are disinclined to engage in indepen-
dent research concerning a strange legal system if they receive no help
from counsel."59
This has led to the occasional judicial practice of refusing to take
judicial notice unless the parties assist in the information-gathering
process.6 In Arams v. Arams,6 1 for example, the court stated:
62
I think the new enactment [the New York judicial notice stat-
ute] was intended merely to dispense with certain formalities
respecting the manner in which the law of the state or country
whose law is first appropriately invoked and determined to be
applicable may be brought to the attention of the court by the
parties, and, in case they may omit something pertinent, to give
the judge the right to make further researches in order to sup-
plement or round out what the parties have presented so as to
make an accurate determination of what the law of that state
or country really is. In short, the enactment was intended as
v. Phillips, 117 Ga. 98, 43 S.E. 494 (1903), the court in dictum had expressed strong
unhappiness with the presumption approach.
That presumptions are often not empirically correct is reflected by the Supreme
Court's statement that:
It does not seem justifiable to assume what we all know is not true-that
French law and our law are the same. Such a view ignores some of the most
elementary facts of legal history-the French reception of Roman law, the con-
sequences of the Revolution, and the Napoleanic codifications.
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 621 (1953).
58 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 27, at 67-69.
59 Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 16.
60 See, e.g., Walton v. American Arabian Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956). See also Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 24.
61 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
62 Id. at 330-31, 45 N.Y.S.2d at 253-54 (discussing N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 4511).
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a safety valve against miscarriages of justice due to mistake, and
not as a charter to every judge to apply whatsoever law he likes
and can find.
The concern with allowing the court to conduct its own foreign
law research 3 is twofold: first, where the law is that of a foreign
nation, judges are usually thought to be ill-prepared to carry out this
responsibility alone;64 second, judicial notice may be unfair to the
parties if the court .has not informed them of its intent to research and
apply a foreign rule.65  The first ground of concern is reflected in the
many statutes which do not extend judicial notice to foreign nation
law at all.6" The second basis of concern has been addressed by
statutes which require that the court give the parties formal notice of
its intent to raise and research a foreign law issue,6 7 but this practice
is not at all uniform.1
8
The judicial notice statutes may have no application at all if the
parties fail to give notice of their intent to rely on a foreign law,69 that
63 See generally SOMMERICH & BuSCH, supra note 14, at 60-69. Courts frequently
have stated that they are not precluded from conducting independent research to
ascertain the law. See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189
(2d Cir. 1955) (English law); Pfleuger v. Pfleuger, 304 N.Y. 148, 106 N.E.2d 495
(1952) (Pennsylvania law); In re McDougald's Estate, 272 App. Div. 176, 70
N.Y.S.2d 200 (3d Dept.), affg 63 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (Canadian law);
Olson v. Kilian, 203 Misc. 847, 119 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (Ontario law);
In re Baruch's Estate, 205 Misc. 1122, 131 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sur. Ct. 1954) (Dutch law):
In re Grant-Suttie, 205 Misc. 640, 129 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sur. CL 1954) (Canadian
law).
64 See, e.g., Sonnesen v. Panama Transp. Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569
(1948); In re Mason, 194 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sur. Ct. 1948).
65 One commentator contends that the court is constitutionally required by due
process to give the parties notice and an opportunity to argue the foreign law.
Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 24, 25. See also 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2573 (3d
ed. 1940); Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 AM. J. COMp. L.
60 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum]; Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving
Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum, The Prob-
lem].
66 The UNIFORM JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAw Acr, 9A UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 569 (1965), sets the pattern here:
The law of a jurisdiction other than those referred to in Section 1 [foreign
nation law] shall be an issue for the court, but shall not be subject to the fore-
going provisions concerning judicial notice.
67 See, e.g., CAL. EVwD. CODE §§ 455(a), 459(c), (d) (West 1966).
68 The federal practice presently is not to require the court to issue formal notice,
although the Advisory Committee Notes state that "the court should give the parties
an opportunity to analyze and counter new points upon which it proposes to rely."
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R. Cv. P. 44.1.
69 This is the effect of the notice requirement in rule 44.1. In Ruff v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1968), the court held that unless
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is, if they fail to satisfy the pleading requirement. The classic exam-
ple of the sudden death effect of the pleading requirement is Walton
v. American Arabian Oil Co.,1° where the Second Circuit held that
the complaint must be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to plead
the applicable foreign law. It stated:
71
[A] court "abuses" its discretion under that statute [New
York's judicial notice statute] perhaps if it takes judicial notice
of foreign "law" when it is not pleaded, and surely does so un-
less the party . . . has in some way assisted the court in judi-
cially learning it.
In effect, the court reverted to the questionable strict pleading and
proof requirement of the common law. Under the Walton analysis,
judicial notice statutes are relegated to a very minor role,72 and the
court's freedom to explore the foreign law issue is severely limited.
Judicial notice statutes were designed to provide the forum court
sufficient flexibility to prevent foreign law issues from being lost or
hidden, and to allow the court, with or without the assistance of
counsel, to research the foreign law in order to insure that the foreign
reasonable written notice of the foreign law issue has been given in the district court,
the appellate court cannot look at the foreign law. See generally SCHLESINGER, supra
note 27, at 68.
In some states, however, failure by the parties to meet the pleading requirement
operates to make judicial notice permissible rather than mandatory. See, e.g., CAL.
Ev'm. CODE §§ 310-11,452-53 (West 1966); N.Y.R. Civ. PR.c. 3016(e).
70 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
71 Id. at 544.
72 Another instance of a federal court's refusal to avail itself of the New York
statute is Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1958). The
basis for failing to take judicial notice there, however, was stated more explicitly
than in Walton. The court observed:
Although this court has the power to take judicial notice of a foreign statute it
does not have the facilities with which to do so. Only recently has this court
begun to establish and maintain a central law library. Unfortunately, due to
causes beyond the control of the court, this library does not contain nor will
it contain for some time to come, the statutes of the several states of the Union,
much less the statutes of any foreign country. This court does not feel it in-
cumbent upon the court to resort to the well-equipped libraries in the neigh-
boring judicial district of this circuit or libraries of state courts in order to
ascertain and determine what is the applicable law of the Province of Quebec.
This is a duty which should be performed by the attorneys for the respective
parties in this case. The court suggests that the attorneys for the respective
parties examine § 391 of the New York Civil Practice Act, which provides in
substance that a printed copy of a statute of a foreign country is presumptive
evidence of that statute. Since the applicable statutes of the Province of
Quebec have not been sufficiently established to the satisfaction of this court
it declines to take judicial notice of what those statutes may be and, therefore
will deny the motion of the defendant . . . for summary judgment.
Id. at 730-31.
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elements of a case are adequately accommodated. As indicated,
however, judicial notice has merely become another technique for
avoiding the foreign law problem."' It has come to be regarded as a
procedural and evidentiary principle, 74 with the substantive effect of
the doctrine being largely ignored. There seems to be more concern
with the form of the statute-whether it is mandatory or permissive,
whether or not it requires the parties to plead the foreign law before
the court may take notice of it-than with a thorough examination of
the relevant foreign law with a view toward reaching the same result
that would be reached in the foreign jurisdiction. In other words,
judicial notice has not been employed to realize the basic objective in
the law of conflicts-the fair accommodation of foreign elements.75
7-3 Dissatisfaction with the concept and the actual operation of judicial notice
led to enactment in 1966 of FFD. R. Civ. P. 44.1. See Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 44.1, quoted in 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACr=C 44.1.01[2], at 1652-54 (2d
ed. 1965). Prior to the enactment of the rule, federal courts seldom conducted
their own research into foreign law and frequently refused to take judicial notice of
the tenor of an alien statute. In Wall Street Traders v. Sociedad Espanola de
Construcion Naval, 236 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), for example, the court dis-
missed a libel in admiralty for failure to plead or prove the applicable Spanish law,
noting:
An alternative would be for this court to take judicial notice of, and apply, the
applicable Spanish law. The reason for the general rule that the federal courts
will not take judicial notice of foreign laws . . . is that the ends of justice will
be better served if the court has the aid of counsel in interpreting that law.
Id. at 359 n.6. Accord, Gates v. P.F. Collier, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 204 (D. Hawaii
1966), aff'd, 378 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968);
Boutin v. Cumbo, 259 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Petition of Pentrol Shipping
Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), a! 'd, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 931 (1966); Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y.
1958).
Under the liberalized procedure of rule 44.1, federal courts are free to conduct
their own foreign law research, unimpeded by rules of evidence. While they have
to some extent taken advantage of the new rule, see, e.g., Diaz v. Southeastern
Drilling Co. of Argentina, S.A., 324 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 449 F.2d
258 (5th Cir. 1971), more commonly the courts continue their old practices. See,
e.g., Ramirez v. Autobuses Blanchos Flecba Roja, S.A. de C.V., 486 F.2d 493 (5th
Cir. 1973) (affirming dismissal of a wrongful death action on the ground that Texas
courts would not apply "unfamiliar" remedial provisions of Mexican tort law, even
though that law was held to be applicable and was proved); Argyll Shipping Co. v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (in the absence of proof to
the contrary the court will presume that the words "arising from general average"
in the English version of the Japanese Commercial Code would mean the same thing
that they do in the forum).
74 See generally Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 5.
75 Expressing a similar view is Miller, supra note 28, at 630. Another assessment
of the judicial notice technique was offered by Professor Currie:
Judicial notice is a convenient rhetorical device for rationalizing-as we seem
to have a compulsion to rationalize-the phenomenon of a court's taking ac-
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Postscript to these Techniques
The resolution of the question of how to reach and apply foreign
law by resort to judicial notice or presumptions may simultaneously
dispose of the basic substantive question in each case involving for-
eign elements-whether the foreign law actually supplies the rule of
decision. This latter question commonly is answered negatively when
courts apply these techniques, as the effect of employing these tech-
niques has often been to ignore or avoid the foreign law. Thus, al-
though intended as mere procedural devices for amending the old
common law fact rule, which frequently led to harsh consequences,
these techniques have become devices for resolving the fundamental
substantive issue, often in a way incompatible with the aims of the
law of conflicts.
THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW IN THE COURTS
It must be admitted, of course, that the forum does not always
resort to techniques for avoiding the foreign law; the courts occasion-
ally do attempt actually to apply it. Yet even where the forum does
not resort to an avoidance device but chooses squarely to face the
conflict, foreign law nevertheless may not perform the function that is
conventionally ascribed to it.
The function of foreign law is usually considered to be supply-
ing the rule of decision if it is held applicable.16 In practice, how-
ever, it is not always applied in this manner. It does not operate like
the law of the forum, and it is not applied in the same sense. Rather,
foreign law is used in various ways with the common purpose of
satisfying the forum's sense of justice. While this notion will be de-
veloped more fully later, 7 it is helpful to take a brief look at some
of the ways in which foreign law has been applied.
count of matters not formally introduced in evidence. It cannot perform magic,
and it can easily get out of hand. Judicial notice cannot dispense with the
necessity of work to find the rule of decision.
CuiuuE, supra note 1, at 34.
76 See, e.g., CumuE, supra note 1, at 66. Professor Currie states that an exception
to this view must be noted in nonconflicts matters, where the foreign law may serve
as supplying a datum point. If, for example, a widow claims workmen's compensa-
tion in New York for the death of her husband there or if she claims to be entitled
as his widow under a New York will, and the validity of the marriage is governed
by Italian law, then this is not a conflicts case at all, as New York law in both cases
furnishes the rule of decision, and Italian law furnishes no more than a datum. Id.
at 69-72, 177-78. The example is taken from Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div.
181, 254 N.Y.S. 439 (3d Dept. 1931).
77 See text accompanying notes 142-53 infra.
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Selective Application of Foreign Law
Even when it applies foreign law, the forum frequently applies
only so much of that law as suits its purposes. This practice is
exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee Coal, Iron,
& R. Co. v. George.78  That case involved an Alabama statutory
provision making an employer liable to his employee for injuries
sustained by reason of defective equipment used in the course of the
employer's business. Another provision required that suits to recover
for such injuries "must be brought in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion within the state of Alabama and not elsewhere. 7 9  When suit
under the Alabama provision was brought in Georgia, the Georgia
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution demanded adherence to the Alabama
jurisdictional limitation. In reversing this decision, the Supreme
Court held that the place of bringing the suit is not part of the cause
of action since the cause of action was transitory:
so
[A] State cannot create a transitory cause of action and at the
same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of
action in any court having jurisdiction.
The Court reached this decision despite its recognition of the respon-
sibility imposed on the forum by the full faith and credit clause:8'
The courts of the sister State trying the case would be bound
to give full faith and credit to all those substantial provisions
of the statute which inhered in the cause of action or which
name conditions on which the right to sue depend.
The internal inconsistency and conceptual weakness of the
Court's analysis are clearly pointed out in Judge Friendly's dissenting
opinion in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc."2 The majority in that
case held that a state may constitutionally apply the wrongful death
statute of a sister state to determine whether the defendant was liable
for the death, while refusing to enforce that statute's limitation on the
amount of recovery. Judge Friendly stated: 3
An important reason why a forum state may not do this
is that it thereby interferes with the proper freedom of action
78 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
79 Id. at 358, citing ALA. CODE § 6115 (1907).
80 233 U.S. at 360.
81 Id.
82 309 F.2d 553, 564 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 912 (1963).
83 Id. at 565.
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of the legislature of the sister state. The terms and conditions
of a claim created by statute inevitably reflect the legislature's
balancing of those considerations that favor and of those that
oppose the imposition of liability. The legislature may be quite
unwilling to create the claim on terms allowing it to be enforced
without limit of amount as most common law rights can be, or
for a period bounded only by statutes of limitations ordinarily
applicable. The Full Faith and Credit Clause insures that, in
making its choice, the legislature creating the claim need not
have to weigh the risk that the courts of sister states looking
to its "public acts" as a source of rights will disregard substan-
tial conditions which it has imposed ....
Putting aside the merits of the debate,8 4 Judge Friendly's analysis
indicates the freedom with which the George Court selectively applied
the foreign law. In finding the cause of action to be transitory and
therefore maintainable in any competent jurisdiction, the Court could
then ignore the foreign provision which would have prevented any
application of the foreign law. The Court was obviously concerned
with the injustice which might have ensued if the foreign cause of
action had not been enforced:8 5
[I]t would be a deprivation of a fixed right if the plaintiff could
not sue the defendant in Alabama because he had left the State
nor sue him where the defendant or his property could be
found because the statute did not permit a suit elsewhere than
in Alabama.
Further illustrating the tendency to apply foreign law selectively
are those cases where the courts have applied the law of more than
one jurisdiction, an action which is contrary to the traditional view
that foreign law, if applied at all, must be applied in its original
form.88 Ostensibly this practice is followed only when severable
issue are involved in the case, but in fact it is not always clear that
the issues are severable. The analysis of the Second Circuit in
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc." is an example of this process. In
that case a wrongful death action was filed in a New York federal
district court by the survivor of a passenger who was killed in an
84 The George holding may have been substantially weakened by Crider v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
85 233 U.S. at 359.
86 One major reason for the traditional view is the quest for uniformity of result.
Uniformity is possible only if the forum applies the foreign law in the same manner
as the foreign jurisdiction would in deciding the case.
87 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.), rev'g on rehearing en banc 307 F.2d 131 (2d, Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
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airplane crash in Massachusetts. Another action arising from the
same accident had previously been maintained in the New York state
courts. The New York Court of Appeals had ruled that under its
choice-of-law rules the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act governed
the issue of liability."" The New York court concluded, however,
that recovery should not be limited to the $15,000 maximum imposed
by the Massachusetts act. In Pearson the Second Circuit held that
the state court of appeals' ruling was correct and that 9
a legitimately interested state . . . may . . . apply a firmly
fixed and long existing policy of its own, although this would
remove a defense provided by an "integral" provision of the
locus' statute creating the cause of action.
Thus, the court rejected the view that foreign law must constitutional-
ly be applied in its entirety if it is applied at all.90
Prior to Pearson it had been held that the forum state may
constitutionally apply its own statute of limitations to bar a cause of
action still viable in the foreign jurisdiction. 91 However, the extent to
which the forum may selectively apply foreign law, according to the
Pearson majority, is not limited by any substance versus procedure
distinction: "The niceties of such legal legerdemain do not concern
us; it is the result that speaks loudly. ' 92  The selective application of
foreign law is supportable on the more general ground that "a state
88 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961).
89 309 F.2d at 562.
90 The question in Pearson was posed as one of "the constitutional power of the
states to develop conflicts of law doctrine." Id. at 555. This determination will
necessarily reflect the extent to which the forum will or will not apply foreign law.
Seen in this light, the significance of the approach rejected by the majority in Pearson
becomes apparent. Briefly, the rejected argument is as follows:
New York is not required to give any faith and credit to the Massachusetts
act, but once it gives Massachusetts law some faith and credit it must also give
it lull faith and credit.
Id. at 557 (emphasis in original).
The reasons compelling this all-or-nothing approach are not strictly constitu-
tional in origin. See Reese, Depegage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law,
73 COLTJM. L. REv. 58, 65-66 (1973). They really derive from the same attitude
that gave rise to the vested rights theory, which was a concern with achieving uni-
formity of result above all else. The movement away from this view is indicated
by the Pearson court's finding that "this construction of the constitutional mandate
[is] untenable." 309 F.2d at 557.
91 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953). Cf. Bournias v. Atlantic
Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955); Lillegraven v. Tengs, 375 P.2d 139
(Alas. 1962).
92 309 F.2d at 558.
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with substantial ties to a transaction in dispute has a legitimate
constitutional interest in the application of its own rules of law. '9 3
As these cases suggest, the courts enjoy a considerable degree of
flexibility in applying foreign law.94 The forum is free to use some
or all of the foreign law, even under the approaches which regard
choice-of-law rules as jurisdiction-selecting, rather than rule-selecting.
How much of the foreign law is applied will depend upon the forum's
sense of justice; the forum will look to foreign law for elements of its
decision if that is what "justice" demands.
The Internal Law Approach Disguised
As noted earlier, some courts avoid the application of foreign
law by presuming that it is identical to the internal law of the
forum. 5 Other courts have accomplished the same result without
resort to presumptions by simply distorting the conflicts approach
which they purport to follow to adhere to a camouflaged internal law
approach. This practice is exemplified by the court's opinion in
Kitzman v. Werner.96 That case involved an action in a Wisconsin
state court by a Wisconsin woman to have her marriage to an epilep-
tic declared valid. The marriage was performed in Minnesota. The
defendant, as court-appointed guardian of the husband, contended
that no valid marriage existed since Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes
prohibited the plaintiff and her husband from entering into a marital
relationship. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that her marriage
93 Id. at 559. It should be noted that the practice has been followed even where
the foreign provision creating the cause of action has a "built-in" statute of limita-
tions. In Lillegraven v. Tengs, 375 P.2d 139 (Alas. 1962), for example, the Alaska
court allowed an Alaskan citizen, injured in British Columbia, to recover from the
Alaskan automobile owner under the British Columbian owner-liability law. This
result was reached despite the fact that the foreign statute's built-in one-year limita-
tion period had expired before suit was brought and despite the fact that Alaska had
no owner-liability law. Cf. Nelson v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329 S.W.2d 426 (1959).
Lillegraven has been criticized even by those who in other circumstances advocate
selecting rules of decision from more than one legal system. See D. CAVEs, THEf
CHOIcE-OF- AW PROCESS 38-41 (1965).
94 Not only may a court utilize part of a foreign law in order to satisfy its sense
of justice, it may reject that law outright while admitting that the foreign law would
otherwise be applicable. For example, in Slater v. Mexican Nat'1 R.R., 194 U.S.
120 (1904), Justice Holmes intimated that in cases where a tort is committed in an
"uncivilized" country, extreme measures are demanded. Id. at 129. That is, the
forum may then apply its own law rather than the law of the place of injury which
is traditionally applied.
95 See text accompanying notes 31-56 supra.
96 167 Wis. 308, 166 N.W. 789 (1918).
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was invalid because of her putative husband's epileptic condition.
Minnesota law provided that "[n]o marriage shall be contracted...
between parties either one of whom is epileptic .... 97 This
provision, however, had been interpreted by the Minnesota courts to
mean that any marriage attempted contrary to such statutory provi-
sions is voidable only.98 The court then turned to Wisconsin law and
noted that at the time of the ceremony Wisconsin prohibited the
marriage of "insane person[s] and idiot[s]." 99  It then concluded
that the marriage was invalid, reasoning that "epilepsy is a serious
mental disease and tends to weaken the power of the afflicted person
and to injure his posterity."'100 This interpretation of Wisconsin law,
according to the court, was strengthened by the recent statutory
amendment adding epileptics to the list of persons incompetent to
marry.
10 '
The court itself acknowledged the distinction between insanity
and epilepsy; yet it held that the marriage offended the public policy
of the forum and was, therefore, invalid.102 While purporting to
follow a conflicts approach the court actually adhered to an internal
law approach. In its view no conflict of laws existed. The public
policies of the two states were equated and both purportedly applied.
Kitzman should not be discounted as an aberration among cases
involving foreign elements. There are other cases in which the
conflict is ignored or distorted and internal law applied.' 0
The opinion of the New York court in In re Peart's EstateT"
further illustrates this practice. The plaintiff, a resident of New
97 MINN. GEN. STAT. § 7090 (1913).
98 State v. Yoder, 113 Minn. 503, 130 N.W. 10 (1911).
99 WIs. STAT. § 2330 (1915).
100 167 Wis. at 315, 166 N.W. at 792.
101 Id. at 316, 166 N.W. at 792.
102 Id.
103 For an example of the appearance of the conflicts approach, see Benton &
Brother v. Singleton, 114 Ga. 548, 40 S.E. 811 (1902).
In some cases the forum's reference to foreign law is no more than a pro forma
exercise. Judge Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals appears to have recog-
nized at least one aspect of this process. In his dissenting opinion in Tooker v.
Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), he states:
In modem theories in the field of conflicts, the analysts have generally posited,
or in fact assumed, as a significant factor the place where the transaction oc-
curred. . . . What has happened of course, is that lip service is paid to the
factor of place, and promptly ignored thereafter, if the forum prefers its own
policy preconceptions and especially if it requires denial of recovery to a plain-
tiff in a tort case.
Id. at 596-97, 249 N.E.2d at 411, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 543 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
104 277 App. Div. 61, 97 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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York, applied for the letters of administration of his deceased wife's
estate. He was opposed by the decedent's sister on the ground that
their marriage was invalid. Plaintiff previously had obtained a di-
vorce from his first wife in Virginia. The divorce decree provided
that the marriage was dissolved but added the statutory require-
ment105 that neither party should marry again within four months
from the date of entry of the decree. Within the four-month period
plaintiff married the decedent in Maryland. The court concluded
that this marriage was valid, despite the failure to comply with the
condition imposed by Virginia law. Explicitly rejecting the authori-
tative interpretation of the Virginia statute by the state's highest
court,10 6 the court regarded the divorce decree as final and absolute.
In its view the marriage would be void in Virginia, but the public
policy of New York directed that the marriage must be considered
valid.1
0 7
The fact that the court did not follow the conflicts approach is
indicated not so much by the application of its internal law as by the
rationale through which that decision was reached. The New York
court ignored entirely the content of the authoritatively interpreted
foreign statutory law. Under a conflicts approach the court would
have recognized the content of that law and then rationalized,
through an appropriate conflicts rule, its failure to apply that law.
As these cases indicate, the result of using an internal law
approach in the conflicts setting is less than satisfactory. It neglects
the community's need to perceive itself as affording due respect to the
competing foreign law, thereby achieving a fair and reasoned result.
Because of the obvious appearance of parochialism when the internal
"O5 Id. at 65, 97 N.Y.S.2d at 882, citing VA. CODE § 20-118 as amended in 1934.
The statute provided:
On the dissolution of the bond of matrimony for any cause arising subsequent
to the date of the marriage, neither party shall be permitted to marry again for
four months from the date of such decree, and such bond of matrimony shall
not be deemed to be dissolved as to any marriage subsequent to such decree..
until the expiration of such four months.
Id. This provision has subsequently been amended and the four-month requirement
repealed. VA. CODE § 20-118 (1975).
106 Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 304, 118 S.E. 316, 321 (1923).
107 The court said:
[W]e hold that the dictum of the highest court of Virginia is not entitled to full
faith and credit in this state, particularly where the rights of our own residents
are being litigated; and that, even accepting the construction at its face value,
we would still consider the decree of Virginia as an absolute and final one, with
consequences.., attaching in Virginia to a violation of one of its provisions-
consequences which do not necessarily affect the finality of the decree of divorce
in other states.
277 App. Div. at 68, 97 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
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law approach is openly followed, attempts to disguise it as a conflicts
approach, such as those described above, are frequently made.
The Adaptation of Foreign Law
Occasionally, courts are faced with foreign laws having no coun-
terpart, wholly or partially, in the domestic legal system. The distinc-
tion between legal and equitable ownership in the English and Ameri-
can law of trusts, for example, does not exist in German law. In
some countries this problem is handled through a doctrine known in
German law as "Anpassung," or adaptation. 108 In cases of this type,
a German judge will apply that part of the German law which is most
similar to the foreign law. Through the Anpassung, the court
seeks to eliminate or minimize the difference between the foreign and
domestic rules. The adaptation should, to the greatest extent possi-
ble, preserve the essence of the foreign law, altering the foreign legal
concept only to the extent that it retains the same meaning and effect
as it has in its own system.'0 9 While no doctrinal counterpart to
Anpassung exists in our legal system, courts have sometimes
handled this foreign law problem by looking to that feature of the
domestic body of law which most closely resembles the idea in the
foreign law to be applied.
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Corn-
panie Generale Transatlantique"0 illustrates this adaptation process.
The issue as framed by the court was whether bills of lading issued in
France were sufficient to incorporate the French law of prescription.
The bills provided that "litigations arising out of interpretation or
execution" should be judged according to French law."' The court
characterized the testimony of the expert on French law relating to
this issue as"'
exceedingly confusing, not due to any fault of his, but inevitable
because of the attempt to import into the French law the re-
fined notion which pervades our own, of a right barred of rem-
edy, but still existing in nubibus.
The court inquired whether the French code superimposed on the
obligations created by the bills of lading a condition which is substan-
108 See II MANUAL oF GERMAN LAW 113 (2d ed., E. Cohn 1971).
109 K. FIRSCRING, EINFOHRUNG IN DAS INTERNATIONALE PRuvATREcRT 45-46 (1974).
"i0 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930).
Ill Id.
112 Id. at 942.
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five in nature in that it barred the foreign right and not merely the
remedy. In raising this question, Judge Hand observed:113
The embarrassment is . . . that we have to interpret another
system of law according to notions wholly foreign to it ...
At any rate it is permissible for us to say that if the assumed
extinguishment which the French law imposes, is itself subject
to conditions which assimilate it to our ordinary statutes of limi-
tation, it makes no difference that it speaks of "extinguish-
ment." We are to decide whether the defense falls within one
class or the other recognized by us, and in that inquiry we are
not necessarily concluded by the terms used; we may assimilate
it rather to matter of remedy, just because it has those condi-
tions which would so determine it in our law.
Finding that the French law of prescription did not provide for
the substance-procedure distinction inhering in American law, 14 the
court attempted to adapt the foreign law to the domestic law of
limitations in the manner most faithful to the essence of the foreign
rule. As the court acknowledged, it did not strictly apply the foreign
law, but only its idea of the Civil Code provision on prescription,
which, admittedly, may be quite different from the intention of the
French statute. 1 5 But in these instances the court does not apply its
own interpretation of foreign law by choice, but rather out of neces-
sity.
The strength of this adaptation technique and its relevance to the
conflicts approach to the foreign law problem are underscored by
comparing Wood & Selick with Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co."'
In that case the Second Circuit again faced the question of whether a
foreign statute of limitations, in this case part of the Panamanian
code, should be regarded as substantive or procedural. In order to
make this determination, the court relied on a test, suggested in Davis
v. Mills:"x7 whether the limitation was "directed to the newly created
liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the
right."" 8  In the court's view the merit of this test was that" 9
"13 Id. at 943.
114 Ironically, French law does in fact make a distinction roughly equivalent to
that involved in Wood & Selick. The notion of "prescription" represents a limitation
which bars a remedy and could therefore be characterized as procedural. The sub-
stantive limitation, which bars the right, is taken over by the French "d~ch~ance."
115 43 F.2d at 943-44.
116 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
117 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
'18 220 F.2d at 156, quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904).
"19 Id. at 156-57.
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[i]t does not lead American courts into the necessity of examin-
ing into the unfamiliar peculiarities and refinements of different
foreign legal systems, and where the question concerns the ap-
plicability of a code provision of a civil law country, this test
seems more appropriate than any of the others. . . . [1]t at
least furnishes a practical means of mitigating what is at best
an artificial rule in the conflict of laws, without exposing us to
the pitfalls inherent in prolonged excursions into foreign law....
The distinction between these two cases is telling. The court in
Wood & Selick felt it was bound to apply French law and, therefore,
found it necessary to interpret provisions from the French code. It
sought to accommodate the foreign elements by adapting the French
law to the forum's legal norms. The facts that the adaptation did not
actually conform to the basic idea in the foreign law and that the
court may have been mistaken in its view of French law are for
present purposes irrelevant. It matters only that the court acknowl-
edged the conflict and then attempted to apply the foreign law in a
manner sensitive to the ideas inherent in that law. The Bournias
court rejected the adaptation approach. Making no effort to accom-
modate the foreign law, the court attempted to avoid any considera-
tion of Panamanian law.
120
The difference in their respective approaches clearly indicates
that the two courts perceived their functions in applying foreign law
to be quite different. While both recognized the inherent difficulties
in reaching and applying foreign rules, Judge Hand nevertheless
considered it to be the forum's responsibility to confront the foreign
law on its own terms. The attitude expressed in Bournias, by con-
trast, was that since the forum cannot adequately handle the foreign
law problem the preferable course is a retreat to its own legal notions.
The Bournias approach ignores the basic function of foreign law in
the conflicts approach: "applying" foreign law requires more than
120 Characterization of the issue as substantive or procedural is, of course, one of
the easier methods of avoiding the foreign law question entirely. In Levy v. Steiger,
233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919), for example, the court applied the Massachu-
setts "due care" statute, even though the auto accident occurred in Rhode Island,
characterizing it as procedural. In so ruling, the court relied on Duggan v. Bay State
Street Ry., 230 Mass. 370, 119 N.E. 757 (1918), a wholly internal case, for the
proposition that: 'The present statute simply affects procedure and the burden of
proof. It does not work any modification of fundamental rights." Id. at 380, 119
N.E. at 761. A recent example of this type of rationalization in another context is
Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (auto accident in Arizona;
California statute allowing survival of actions, characterized as procedural, applied
by California court).
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mere reference to that law; it demands that foreign law be considered
on its own terms.
ELEMENTS OF THE FOREIGN LAW PROBLEM
Reasons of Practicality
The commonly articulated explanation for the inability of courts
to "reach" foreign law is the practical difficulty encountered in efforts
to research and understand a foreign legal system. Several factors-
language difficulties,' 21 variant legal systems,122 and varying methods
of practice and procedure' 2 ---exacerbate the problem of finding and
interpreting foreign law. 124 As one writer has stated:
125
121 The langiage difficulties are likely to be substantial, particularly if the foreign
jurisdiction is not an Anglo-American jurisprudential system. One reason for the
difficulty is that courts spend a great deal of time supplying technical definitions to
words so that their meaning is other than that commonly understood. Professor
Alan Watson recently has stated this problem in the context of comparative law:
Too much has to be taken on trust from other writers, including other com-
paratists, too often knowledge is derived from too few original sources, and too
frequently linguistic deficiencies interpose a formidable barrier between the
scholar and his subject. This last aspect must be emphasized. What in other
contexts would be regarded as a good knowledge of a foreign language may not
be adequate for the comparatist. Homonyms present traps. The French contrat,
domicile, tribunal administratif, notaire, prescription and juge de paix, are not
the English 'contract', 'domicile', 'administrative tribunal', 'notary public', 'pre-
scription' and 'justice of the peace'.
A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAw 11 (1974)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as WATSON].
A useful example of the language problem is found in American tax law. The
tax courts in this country have defined the geographic source of income as the point
where title to goods passes. Exolon Co., 45 B.T.A. 844 (1941); Ronrico Corp., 44
B.T.A. 1130 (1941). In Mexico, for example, there is also a concern with fixing
the geographic source of income. They have defined source, however, to be that
point where the contract of sale is executed. A. JIMENEZ, LEY DEL IMPUESTO SO-
BREDF. REmrA Capitulo II, Articulo 60, Parrafos Primero y Segundo (Mexico 1954).
In this context the normal translation of the Spanish word "fuentes" into the English
word "source" probably would result in great misunderstanding. See Address by
John C. McKenzie, ABA Section on International and Comparative Law, August 25,
1959. For another discussion of the difficulties encountered in transplantation, see
Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law-Some Reflections on "Compara-
tive" and "Contrastive" Law, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 887, 916-20 (1956).
122 See Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 15.
123 See Keeffe, Landis & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense about Judicial Notice, 2
STAN. L. Rv. 664 (1950); Nussbaum, supra note 65; Nussbaum, The Problem, supra
note 65; Sommerich & Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law,
38 CORNELL L.Q. 125 (1953).
124 In proposing various means of "discovering" foreign law, commentators have
acknowledged the many hurdles facing counsel and the courts. See, e.g., SOM-
MERICH & BuscH, supra note 14.
125 Zajtay, supra note 6, at 14-13. See also Nussbaum, The Problem, supra note
65.
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Generally speaking the court has not the same certain and com-
plete knowledge of foreign law as it possesses of the lex fori.
This insufficient knowledge of foreign law, which is the natural
consequence of the training of the judges in the law of their
own country, affects decisively the circumstances in which the
problem [of foreign law] arises.
These difficulties are not peculiar to American practice. Al-
though civil law courts have employed other methods of reaching
foreign law, their experiences reveal that the same possibility of
misconstruing foreign law is present. In some continental courts, for
example, written statements by experts,'26 testimony of officially des-
ignated experts, 127 and statements of foreign governmental officials 128
serve as primary sources of evidence on the content of foreign law.
These techniques have proved as ineffective in the process of attempt-
ing to understand foreign law as the previously discussed techniques
employed by American courts.'
29
Prescriptive Reasons
The judicial treatment of foreign law is also strongly affected by
a basic prescriptive principle in the law of conflicts which dictates that
foreign law must be applied as it would be by the courts of the foreign
jurisdiction. 3 ° In other words, the forum court must stand in the
position of the courts of the foreign jurisdiction and "interpret the
126 See generally INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN LrIGATION: EuRoPE (H. Smit
ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as EuRoPE]; Miller, International Cooperation in Litiga-
tion between the United States and Switzerland: Unilateral Procedural Accommoda-
tion in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1069, 1127-29 (1965).
127 See G. WHITE, THE USE OF EXPERTS BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 15-33
(1965).
128 See Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 546-47, 552-53 (1953).
129 The basic weakness of these techniques is the limited scope of investigation
which they permit. Their approach is unlike materially that of the comparative
method utilized in other continental countries. See text accompanying notes 157-60
infra.
130 Expressions of this view are legion. Two recent examples are Eek, Peremp-
tory Norms and Private International Law, 139 RECUEIL DES CoURs 1, 18 (1973)
("The case should be decided as if it were being dealt with by a court in the lex
causae country.") and Zajtay, supra note 6:
When the rules of the conflict of laws of the lex fori require the application of
foreign law, they clearly require that it should be applied correctly, namely,
that the foreign rule should be applied exactly as it is in force in the country
of its origin.
Id. at 14-24. See A. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 257-58
(1943).
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rule of the applicable foreign law in accordance with the principles of
the legal system in question."' 31  It is hoped that adherence to this
principle will minimize the number of potentially conflicting or incon-
sistent decisions, thus leading to uniform results.
One traditional objective of conflicts rules has been to discourage
forum shopping. 132 Uniformity of result is thought to accomplish this
goal.' 33 It is also prescribed as the most efficient means of achieving
predictability, another basic goal in conflicts theory. 3 4  It is felt that
131 Zajtay, supra note 6, at 14-24.
132 See, e.g., von Mehren, supra note 11, at 350. As long ago as the mid-nine-
teenth century, the ideal was stated to be
that, in cases of conflict of laws, the same legal relations (cases) have to expect
the same decision, whether the judgment be pronounced in this state or that.
8 F. SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN R5MISCHEN REcHT 27 (1829) (trans. W.
GUTHRIE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RETROSPEcTIVE OPERATION OF
STATUTES 69-70 (2d ed. 1880)) (emphasis in original).
'33 See, e.g., Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 392 Pa. 58, 139 A.2d 638
(1958), where the court stated:
We believe that in this day of multistate commercial transactions it is par-
ticularly desirable that the determination of the place of contracting be the same
regardless of the state in which suit is brought. The absence of uniformity
makes the rights and liabilities of the parties to a contract dependent upon the
choice of the state in which suit is instituted and thus encourages "forum-
shopping." For this reason we chose [sic] to follow the established pattern of
decisions and hold that acceptance by telephone of an offer takes place where
the words are spoken.
Id. at 62, 139 A.2d at 640.
Some courts have limited the uniformity principle to cases involving consensual
transactions, where the parties are able to plan in advance and where predictability
is an especially important consideration. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351,
222 A.2d 205 (1966).
134 The appeal of uniformity and predictability is not restricted to the conflicts
setting. As Grant Gilmore has explained, it forms the foundation of much of our
legal thinking:
To people who are professionally situated as lawyers are, the idea that the
future is, or can be made, predictable is almost irresistably appealing. "The
object of our study," Holmes told us, "is prediction" and went on to say that the
very idea of law comes down to "prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing more pretentious . . . ." Instinctively, we nod approvingly ....
Closely allied, in the legal mind, with the idea of predictability is the idea
of certainty. The two ideas, in the legal context, are so closely related as to be
very nearly identical twins ....
Our obsessive need for certainty has led us to place a high premium on
unity of doctrine ....
Our obsession with unity, certainty, and predictability has led us to convert
those values into absolutes. Our goal-our Utopia-has been complete unity,
total certainty, absolute predictability.
Gilmore, The Age of Antiquarius: On Legal History in a Time of Troubles, 39 U.
CHI. L. REV. 475, 482-84 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
The goal of predictability is one justification for a jurisprudential system based
upon precedent Predictability is seen by some as a desirable end because "[human
beings... have a strong craving for security." R. WASSEESTROM, THE JUDICIAL
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justice is achieved when the forum judge applies the rules of the legal
system most "concerned" in the dispute, thereby disposing of the
matter in a manner consistent with that followed in other jurisdic-
tions.
Uniformity of result and the concomitant elimination of forum
shopping are possible only through a restriction on jurisdiction or the
adoption of a uniform standard prescribed by a higher legal sys-
tem. 13 5 In the absence of either, decisional harmony depends upon a
shared perception of justice, a condition dependent upon the extent to
which relevant values are shared. Differences with respect to the
relevant values among the concerned communities are reflected in the
variant standards applied by each community's legal order-the more
the standards diverge, the more likely it is that the concerned legal
orders will disagree as to a just outcome.
With respect to any given issue, all states might agree that
jurisdiction is available in only one legal system. Because only one
forum would be available, the choice among competing rules would
turn solely on that court's determination as to the justice of the
solutions offered by the several rules. But many considerations
which are basic to our law of conflicts would be sacrificed by the
adoption of such a scheme. The assumption of jurisdiction frequent-
ly depends upon the convenience of litigating in a particular jurisdic-
tion and the facility of enforcing judgments, factors which do not
always point to one jurisdiction. 3 6 Assurance of uniformity through
jurisdictional restrictions, then, seems undesirable.
Absent jurisdictional limitations, uniformity of result is possible
only through adherence to a higher legal order. However, if the rules
prescribed by a higher legal system are not also dispensed by that
system, uniform results are unlikely, because it will continue to be
necessary to interpret rules and interpretations frequently differ.'
DEcisioN 62 (1961) [hereinafter cited as WASSERSTROM). But, as Professor Wasser-
strom subsequently observed, the value of a predictable legal system is limited. A
legal system whose decisions are predictable is not necessarily made desirable:
"even if certainty is a necessary condition for approval, it is not a sufficient con-
dition." Id. at 63. The relevance of this observation to predictability in the field
of conflicts will be developed subsequently. See text accompanying note 141 infra.
135 Cf. von Mehren, supra note 11, at 350-51.
136 For an excellent exposition of the factors properly involved in the assumption
of jurisdiction, see A. voN ME-mEN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAw OF MULTSTATE
PROBLEMs 630-36 (1965) [hereinafter cited as VoN MEHREN & TRAtTrMAN].
137 See Black, The Bremen, COGSA, and the Problem of Conflicting Interpreta-
tion, 6 VA.D. J. TRASNAT'L L. 365, 370 (1973). Although the specific problem
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Although the forum may turn to foreign law as supplying the rule of
decision in a given case, the court will very likely interpret that law as
if it were interpreting and applying a local rule.1"" In the process of
interpretation, a court is usually called upon to derive the rule for an
individual case from specific foreign statutory provisions and general
principles embodied in the particular legal system. Seldom will a
foreign precedent completely cover the case before the court. Be-
cause of the forum's unfamiliarity with the foreign system, it is unlike-
ly that its interpretation will be identical to that which would have
been given by the courts of that foreign system. 139 Even where there
is a relationship between the two systems, as in the case of two sister
states, there will still be a considerable disparity in the interpretative
process. To some indefinable extent, then, the study of the foreign
legal system will be subjectively selective. 40
But even assuming that uniformity of decision is a realistic goal,
i.e., that it can be achieved in a signficant proportion of instances, it is
not, without more, a sufficient basis for an ideal model of how
conflicts cases ought to be resolved. To require uniformity in the
choice-of-law process is to formalize it without considering the nature
of the substantive results that would follow in a predictable pattern.
In short, uniformity may be a desirable attribute, but it does not
assure the desirability of any conflicts model."4'
The Self-Ended Nature of Legal Systems
Behind these contributing factors to the foreign law problem,
considered in this article is considerably narrower than the rather general view taken
here, the need for a higher dispensation is common to both subjects. Professor
Black apparently recognized as much when he stated,
Of course, the scheme I have here put forward could be applied to other sub-
jects than the Hague Rules and COGSA. I have used COGSA simply as a para-
digm.
Id. at 373.
138 See Zajtay, supra note 6, at 14-24 n.149.
'39 The difficulty of interpreting the laws of a foreign system is aggravated by
the inconstant character of laws. It may not be sufficient for the forum to interpret
a foreign rule literally, at least if an interpretation true to the foreign law is desired.
The effect of any law may differ from time to time. See WATSON, supra note 121,
at 19-20.
140 That the laws of two states are expressed in similar or even identical language
does not necessarily indicate that they share a common effect or policy. This is
true both of statutes and decisional rules. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Ap-
proach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972). Compare Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d
120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) with Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d
569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). Cf. Trautman, Two Views on
Kell v. Henderson: A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 459, 465 (1967).
141 Cf. WAssEnstoM, supra note 134, at 60-66.
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there lies an essentially jurisprudential explanation: the self-ended
nature of legal systems generally and of the forum in particular. Any
examination of this phenomenon must begin with a consideration of
the fundamental differences between communities:
142
In the contemporary world . . . individuals and enterprises
often participate in the affairs of several communities; a single
course of conduct may be viewed in differing economic, social,
and political terms by each of the communities to which the ac-
tivity is in some sense related.
That communities differ in their perceptions of desirable means and
ends is evidenced by the very need for a law of conflicts which can
accommodate in some fair and systematic way the different values in
a given transaction.
An identity of language, form, and concept among the laws of
different legal systems does not necessarily indicate an identity of the
underlying values attending those laws. For example, 14
3
[t]he fact that two systems share a general conception of con-
tract tells us nothing definitive about the policies and values that
these legal orders would desire to advance in the context of par-
ticular contractual problems.
This is not to say that the laws of different legal systems always reflect
different values. Instances of similarity need not concern us, how-
ever, as they are not cases of true conflict. That is, if the substantive
and procedural values inherent in a foreign law parallel those of the
forum, then, assuming that the primary concern is with reaching a
substantively just solution, it is immaterial which law is applied.
The most troubling cases in this field are those in which the
respective values are different. In such a case, the difference usually,
but not always, is indicated by a conceptual disagreement between the
laws involved. While conceptual differences are the result of value
disparities, they do not disclose all such disparities. Two apparently
similar laws may be dissimilar in their underlying values.'4 The
cutting edge of a just and fair resolution in a conflict of laws is
precisely the identification of these values.
Identification of competing values must begin with a statement
of their discrepancy. The values may be discerned directly from the
substantive law involved. Substantive rules are enacted to promote
varying policies or interests, which in turn have varying degrees of
142 von Mehren, supra note 11, at 349.
14 Id. at 352.
144 See note 140 supra.
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specificity. For example, the common law fellow servant rule4 5
essentially provides that an injured employee cannot recover against
the master if his injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow
servant. Implicit in the rule is the notion that the most effective
means of assuring due care among employees is admonition by each
other and that such admonition is encouraged by denying recovery
against the master to any employee injured by another. The rule
serves other interests as well. It contributes to lower costs for the
employer, and it may promote a sense of responsibility and indepen-
dence in employees. Any or all of these interests may be involved in
a single case to varying extents.
The values inherent in substantive laws may be identified fairly
easily,146 but they do not represent all the legitimate interests that a
legal system may have in a case. There remain more general values,
such as the forum's interest in the procedures used to settle a dispute.
This interest is not merely one of advancing the efficient administra-
tion of justice but also one of ensuring fairness in the procedural
rules that govern litigation. 14 7 A jurisdiction may also have a general
interest in a case because a member of its community is involved in
the dispute. The origin of this interest has been effectively stated
elsewhere: 1
48
So long as there are separate communities in the world not all
sharing the same values, each community will have, and on oc-
casion will assert, a general concern on the basis of the fact that
one of the parties belongs to that community.
This community value has seldom been articulated in recent deci-
sions, but this does not mean that it does not exist or that it has no
function in this process. It simply indicates that courts are reluctant
to openly articulate an apparently provincial value.
145 The values inherent in the fellow servant rule are discussed in connection
with the facts of Alabama R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892), in VON
MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 136, at 105-09.
148 Professors von Mehren and Trautman have suggested as a general account of
substantive concerns four categories of rules: (1) rules which express concern with
the person (e.g., rules on the capacity of married women to contract); (2) rules
which express concern with conduct (e.g., tort rules); (3) rules which express con-
cern with private order (e.g., the bases of many contracts rules may be explained
along this line); (4) rules which express concern for community order (e.g., criminal
rules). VON MEHREN & TRAJ TMAN, supra note 136, at 115-16.
147 See, e.g., Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 198 U.S. 508 (1905).
Cf. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process
Values," 60 CORNELL L. Rav. 1, 20-27 (1974).
148 VON MnmREN & TRAUrMAN, supra note 136, at 162.
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The values inhering in a legal system, which reflect the values of
the community as a whole, tend to be exclusive of the values of other
systems. Every society regards its moral, social, and political values
not as mere expedients, but rather as part of the natural order of
things. Because of their essential quality, they are often marked by
this exclusive characteristic.
14 9
It is this characteristic which best explains the tendency of legal
systems to be self-ended. Unless there is frequent contact between
the respective communities, legal systems will tend to prefer their own
familiar values. They often lack an intelligent appreciation of the
values inherent in a competing system. An understanding of another
legal system can be acquired only through contact and, hence, famil-
iarity with that system and its values. Absent this contact, the forum
will examine unfamiliar laws as a foreigner, 15 0 interpreting a foreign
law in light of its own values. An objective examination and evalua-
tion of the laws of another system, prescribed in the application of
foreign law, requires some degree of empathy for the values peculiar
to that system. Otherwise, the treatment of foreign law cannot be
commensurate with that of domestic law: 1 1
Moreover, try as we may to apply the foreign law as it comes
to us through the lips of the experts, there is an inevitable haz-
ard that, in those areas, perhaps interstitial but far from inconse-
quential, where we have no clear guides, our labors, moulded
by our own habits of mind as they necessarily must be, may
produce a result whose conformity with that of the foreign court
may be greater in theory than it is in fact.
Thus, self-endedness does not mean that the forum necessarily
tends to apply its own law or even to prefer its own substantive
values. 5 1 It rather suggests that because legal systems have little
'49 See Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 HARv. L. REv. 838, 858
(1922).
150 For an expression of this view, see Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,
391 (1974). See text accompanying note 9 supra.
151 Conte v. Flota Mercante del Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir. 1960).
Citing this passage, the court in Hernandez v. Cali, Inc., 32 App. Div. 2d 192, 301
N.Y.S.2d 397 (1969), aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 903, 265 N.E.2d 921, 317 N.Y.S.2d 625
(1970), declined jurisdiction even though the maritime tort occurred in New York
territorial waters. Since the owners of the vessel were Panamanian residents and
the nonresident defendant stipulated to appear in Panamanian courts, the court con-
cluded that the case should be tried in the Republic of Panama. It added: "Mhat
would be a forum where all parties would have some measure of familiarity with the
law that must govern the case." 32 App. Div. 2d at 195, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
See also CuRmIE, supra note 1, at 9.
152 The term is not synonymous with the "homeward trend" discussed by some
writers. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 65; Nussbaum, The Problem, supra note 65.
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familiarity with other systems and their values, the forum's view of
foreign law may be colored by the values of the forum community.
The self-ended system'
53
deals not with foreign values as such, but with its own idea of
what these values must be. While it pays lip service to the find-
ing and manipulating of foreign values, it actually remakes them
in order to integrate them into its own system.
The inclination toward sef-endedness is an inherent element in the
problem of applying foreign law. The other, more practical difficul-
ties may be reduced, but this factor persists in a world where value
systems, though interconnected, are not yet unified.
CONCLUSION
The problem that courts confront in attempting to apply foreign
law is exceedingly difficult. The analysis in the preceding pages
indicates the lack of success that courts have had in finding and
applying foreign rules. What is needed are more sophisticated, com-
parative techniques which will enable courts to consider foreign law
in a broader context than is now provided in this country. Courts
must begin to interpret foreign laws in light of relevant cultural,
geographical and, most important, political factors. 54 Unless these
factors are considered, it is quite probable that the statutory provision
or case law applied in a particular case will not be one that a court of
the foreign jurisdiction would select or that the forum's reading of the
foreign rule will not mirror the foreign jurisdiction's understanding of
the law. The law in fact applied is more likely to resemble the
forum's law on the particular question.
Although the details of such comparative techniques are beyond
the scope of this article, a useful starting point-at least in the context
of conflicts with the laws of other nations' 55-would be the experi-
ence of European courts in applying foreign law. Both litigants and
courts in some continental countries have had much more flexibility
in their attempts to come to grips with unfamiliar foreign laws.5 6
German and French courts in particular have benefitted from re-
search conducted by comparative law centers. 11 Upon the request
158 Nekam, The Law of Conflicts and Comparative Law: Some Similarities and
Limitations, 34 LA. L. REv. 1077, 1079 (1974).
154 See Kahn-Freund, On the Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD.
L REV. 1 (1974).
155 The foreign law problem is clearest in this context. See note 3 supra.
156 See generally EUROPE, supra note 126; Sass, supra note 13.
157 In Germany, the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private
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of a court, the centers provide information and offer opinions on
questions of foreign law.15 8  Because in some countries the burden of
researching foreign law is placed on the court,159 considerable use is
made of such institutes. The availability of this form of research
assistance has relieved the burden to a considerable extent, obviating
in most cases the need, for example, for expert witnesses.'8 0
This comparative approach to the foreign law problem appears
to be a natural concomitant of a serious attitude in a legal system
toward its responsibility to apply foreign law.' 6 1  Efforts in this
direction are essential if the choice-of-law process is to function
meaningfully and properly; it is not sufficient for a court to make
mere reference to a foreign rule or for the court and the parties to
engage in cursory research of the foreign law. These efforts may
not be completely successful. Although they may eliminate many of
the practical difficulties that contribute to the foreign law problem,
they cannot overcome the inherent limitations upon the forum's abil-
ity to put aside its own values and consider objectively foreign laws.
But recognition of these limitations must not lead to resignation; our
sense of justice demands that the attempt be made to accommodate
foreign elements.
Law is a semiofficial organization which researches questions of foreign law and
furnishes legal opinions on those questions. See Domke, American-German Private
Law Relation Cases 1945-1955, in BILATERAL STUDIES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAw, No. 4, at 92 (1956); Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law in New York: A Pro-
posed Amendment, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 348, 353 (1957). The French Center of
Comparative Law, established in 1951, combines three previously existing organiza-
tions, the Socijtg de Ligislation Comparde, the Institut de Droit Comparg de l'Univer-
sitg de Paris, and the Comitg de Ldgislation Etrangdre et de Droit International of
the Ministry of Justice. See Delaume, American-French Private International Law,
in BILATERAL STUDIES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, No. 2, at 172 (2d ed. 1961).
158 On the workings of the Max Planck Institute, the best known of such com-
parative law centers, see generally Riegert, The Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Private Law, 21 ALA. L. REV. 475 (1969).
159 Austrian and German courts, for example, are required to conduct their own
research of foreign law even where the parties offer no assistance whatsoever.
Moreover, these courts take a very active role in framing the foreign law issue, quite
apart from the proof of that law. Sass, supra note 13, at 357-59.
160 The drawbacks of reliance on expert witnesses in questions of foreign law are
suggested in A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (1967), and EHRENZ-
WEIb, supra note 10, at 365.
161 The paradigm of such an attitude would appear to be that of Germany. The
West German provision on proof of foreign law goes even beyond our federal rule
44.1. Zivilprocessordnung § 293. See note 159 supra.
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